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The Limited Prospects of Deterrence by the International Criminal Court: Lessons from 
Domestic Experience  
The preamble of the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
states that the parties are “[d]etermined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”
1
 Theoretically, there are multiple 
ways in which the ICC could prevent crimes.  It could, for example, incapacitate abusers through 
imprisonment, or could impose sufficient punishment to lessen the chance of revenge attacks.  
From the founding of the ICC, though, supporters have also stressed that prevention could come 
through deterrence of future abuses.
2
  The principle of deterrence is that no rational actor will 
commit an abuse if the perceived costs of that action exceed the perceived gains from the action.  
The ICC’s focus on deterrence is demonstrated in the first Report of the International Criminal 
Court to the United Nations which states, “By punishing individuals who commit these crimes, 
the Court is intended to contribute to the deterrence of such crimes.”
3
  Additionally, the report 
asserts, “The establishment of the International Criminal Court was a historic development in 
efforts to hold accountable perpetrators of the most serious international crimes and to deter such 
crimes.”
4
  Furthermore, Leslie Vinjamuri has noted that, over time, ICC supporters have put 
more stress on arguments of deterrence and other such “instrumental purposes of justice,” rather 
than on the “moral obligation or a legal duty to prosecute the perpetrators.”
5
 
The ICC now has over 120 member states that have accepted ICC jurisdiction over their 
countries and citizens covering crimes occurring after 2002.  This broad jurisdiction should give 
the ICC a greater deterrent effect than previous ad hoc tribunals whose limited jurisdictions 
meant violators could gamble that their actions would never come under international review.  
The deterrent effect should be strongest among  member states, but since the UN can refer cases 
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of non-members for investigation, a strong ICC in theory also could deter non-members.  Some 
scholars and experts believe,  even with  limited specific evidence, that there should be a default 
assumption that deterrence will work, because humanity’s core rationality means that “the more 
[emphasis in original] reasonable claim surely seems to be that punishment exerts a deterrent 
effect.”
6
  Unfortunately, these hopes have not translated into reality.  There have been recent 
massive human rights violations, for example, in Syria, Burma, and Turkmenistan, as well as 
ongoing violations in Uganda, Sudan, and Libya, despite ICC investigations and indictments in 
those cases.  These facts demonstrate that the ICC has had only a minimal deterrent effect in its 
first ten years of existence. 
This limited deterrent effect is in line with what many academics from a range of 
backgrounds predicted.  These scholars argued that politicians and ICC supporters were 
optimistically exaggerating the deterrent impact of international courts.
7
  These and other 
scholars fall into two camps: those who feel that the realities of the court and the international 
system mean that the ICC will never have a significant deterrent effect, and those who argue that 
deterrence could increase in the future as the court matures
8




The basic dispute over whether the ICC can have a deterrent effect and the secondary 
question of whether institutional reforms could significantly increase future deterrence show the 
importance of further exploring the logic of effective deterrence.  Significant insight can be 
gained by applying the lessons learned from the broad literature in criminology, legal studies, 
psychology, economics, and other fields that have examined the effectiveness of deterrence in 
the domestic setting.  Most writings and commentaries from all sides of the ICC discussions pay 
little or no attention to domestic experiences, and assume that deterrence is a fully proven and 
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effective concept that must simply be recreated in the international court system.  In fact, several 
recent reviews of the domestic literature in different disciplines conclude exactly the opposite.  
As Paul H. Robinson and John M. Darley state, “ Rule formulation has a deterrent effect only in 
those unusual situations in which the preconditions to deterrence exist. Even there, the deterrent 
effects are quite minor and unpredictable.”
10
 
Pratt and his co-authors  find that “the effects of the variables specified by deterrence theory on 
crime/deviance are, at best, weak—especially in studies that employ more rigorous research 
designs.”
11
  Raymond Paternoster concludes, “We do not have very solid and credible empirical 
evidence that deterrence through the imposition of criminal sanctions works very well.”
12
  
Finally, Cook and Roesch argue, “‘Tough on crime’ policies are . . . ineffective at deterring 
individuals from committing crimes.
13
  
The studies arguing that domestic deterrence has not been generally effective have been 
able to establish criteria needed for successful deterrence.  Deterrence only works if potential 
criminals 1) make rational calculations before their actions, 2) know the laws and, ideally, accept 
them as legitimate limits on their behavior, 3) feel that the benefits of a given crime are relatively 
low, and 4) believe the costs of the crime are high as influenced by the certainty, swiftness, and 
severity of punishment.  Meeting all four criteria is difficult in domestic settings, so domestic 
deterrence effects are often low. 
There only have been a few studies that have directly attempted to connect the domestic 
literature and international courts.
14
  These studies are useful  to show why meeting the criteria 
for deterrence is even more difficult in the international arena, but they  do not fully extrapolate 
all the possible points from the domestic examples, and they lack evidence from the most recent 
years of the ICC. 
3
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A more complete exploration of the domestic lessons, in conjunction with an examination 
of the current realities of the international system and a review of the existing experiences and 
studies of the ICC and of other recent international courts - such as the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) - yields many insights.  This combined approach allows a more in-depth understanding 
of why ICC deterrence has been minimal so far, answers the challenge of those who say that the 
default assumption should be that deterrence will work, and suggests why deterrence will 
continue to be low in the future unless reforms go beyond technical changes to a significant 
reordering of the international system. 
Before proceeding, it is important to clarify a few key ideas.  The precise measurement of 
deterrent effects is impossible in part because it is more difficult to empirically measure the 
absence of an action rather than its occurrence.  Also, multiple variables could contribute to an 
increase or decrease in abuses, so determining the precise impact of the ICC would require an in-
depth examination of how dozens of variables affected thousands of individual decisions.  Still, 
since deterrence is based on individual calculation and different people have different thresholds 
of cost-benefit, it is logical to conclude that the ICC deterrent impact is more than zero.  Those 
deterred, though, are likely the people least committed to abusive actions and therefore also the 
ones most susceptible to other forms of preventive action.  Thus, the existence of occasional 
cases of effective deterrence do not justify claims that the ICC is having a major impact or prove 
that it is the best route to prevention. 
In domestic settings, analysts typically draw a distinction between methods of specific 
deterrence, which seek “to deter individuals already convicted of crimes from committing crimes 
in the future,” and those of general deterrence, which attempt “to deter all members of society 
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from engaging in criminal activity.”
15
  In the case of international courts, specific deterrence is of 
less importance, since most human rights violators will not return to positions of power if they 
are successfully tried and punished.  The ICC therefore usually focuses on general deterrence, 
where prosecution of someone from one country seeks to deter crimes being committed in other 
countries.  Additionally, David Bosco has made the useful observation that the ICC may at times 
seek targeted deterrence where investigating a particular individual or group that has already 
committed some abuses in a given country seeks to generally deter future abuse in that specific 
country.
16
  For example, indicting Serbians at the ICTY could target deterrence at other Serbians 
committing violations.  General deterrence thus focuses on overall abuse prevention and targeted 
deterrence focuses on stopping extant abuses.  The reasons why both general deterrence and 
targeted deterrence usually will fail are similar, but some of the following arguments are more 
applicable to one or the other deterrence type.   
To date, the ICC has used its discretion to focus on state leaders, other high-level 
officials, or prominent rebel leaders, but the ICC Appeals Chamber has argued, in relation to 
events in the Democratic Republic of Congo that, “It seems more logical to assume that the 
deterrent effect of the Court is highest if no category of perpetrators is per se excluded from 
potentially being brought before the Court.”
17
  Thus, most of the following arguments will focus 
on leaders, but some attention will be paid to the possible deterrence of lower-level perpetrators. 
Rationality of Decision 
The principle of deterrence rests on a rational calculation of costs and benefits.  The idea 
that criminal actions come from rational calculations was raised in the eighteenth  century by 
Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham, whose works greatly influenced the study of criminology.  
5
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Their ideas, though, were not universally accepted and, over time, became the minority view.  
Later work focused on crime as a product of psychological factors or social conditions, so 
deterrence was not a major part of government crime prevention strategies.  It was not until the 
late-1960s that work by economist Gary S. Becker and others revived the idea of rational 
criminals.
18
  Since then, much academic study has focused on exploring claims of criminal 
rationality and the idea of deterrence has become central to tougher policing and punishment 
strategies.   
In part because the academic focus on rationality is relatively new and challenges long-
held beliefs, some dispute remains; however, there is now widespread support for the idea that 
most criminals are rational.  Rationality in this case does not mean that criminals must have 
perfect information, or process information without their own perceptions somewhat skewing the 
conclusions.  Instead, rationality means that most criminals “intuit the values and costs of an 
action . . . and act within the limits of their abilities to pursue what they perceive as the most 
satisfying.”
19
   
There are, though, several factors on an individual or group level that can interfere with 
such rational calculations at the time of a crime, so there is a subset of criminals whose thought 
process would not be considered rational by most observers.  For example, some crimes are 
committed by people suffering from diagnosable mental or physical illnesses.  Others commit 
crimes while under the influence of drugs or alcohol.  Additionally, a given person can be 
affected by short-term psychological stressors.  The desire for revenge is one trigger that can 
induce rage leading to criminal action in an otherwise law-abiding person.  Some studies of 
domestic deterrent effects therefore suggest that crimes of passion and other cases lacking 
premeditation cannot be deterred.
20
  Group effects also can alter calculations.  Prestige within the 
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group may depend on bold and even criminal activities.  Studies show a group “arousal effect” 
that can lead to sprees of violence.
21
  Other classic studies suggest a phenomenon called 
“deindividuation” that leads people to believe that their individual actions as part of a violent 
mob will be lost in the overall group movement.
22
  Criminals affected by any of these factors will 
not make the rational calculations necessary for deterrence. 
On the international level, most potential criminals are rational.  Genocides are not 
primitive, emotional outbursts of group violence.  They are calculated policy choices.  Similarly, 
torture, group rape, systematic denial of personal rights, and other such crimes, are political 
calculations, not random actions.  One sign that human rights abusers make some rational 
calculations is that they often attempt to conceal their crimes by burying bodies, wearing masks, 
or setting up complex command structures to provide a degree of deniability if actions are 
investigated.  Thus, there is usually an overall rationality and purpose behind human rights 
violations; however, some individual violators may not be rationally considering their actions for 
reasons similar to the subset of non-rational domestic criminals. 
On the leadership level, true psychosis or repeated alcohol and drug impairment is 
difficult to prove, but certainly academics and other observers have questioned the decision-
making processes of some leaders.  Leaders with true impairment, though, should be relatively 
rare since maintaining power requires careful calculations.  Leaders’ rationality may, though, be 
skewed by their passionate belief in the superiority of their own nation, ethnicity, religion, or 
ideology.  They might feel they are working “to create a ‘better world’ . . . [and] see their actions 
as necessary or serving a higher good.”
23
  They also may devalue or dehumanize the enemy, so 
believe it is acceptable to kill or torture them.  Over time, leaders may disengage their internal 
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These factors help explain events such as genocides and torture of those labeled terrorists or 
enemies of the state.  If driven by these factors, leaders may still be rational in the sense of being 
goal-driven and calculating, but their calculations are so far outside the norm that deterrent 
threats would be ineffective. 
On a broader level, evidence suggests that as a group, domestic criminals have 
personality traits that encourage deviant actions and decrease fear of punishment.  They are “less 
inclined to think at all about the consequences of their conduct or to guide their conduct 
accordingly. They often are risk-seekers, rather than risk-avoiders, and as a group are more 
impulsive than the average.”
25
  “They are prone to hyper-discounting of risk and inflation of the 
immediate value of their actions.”
26
  Internationally, potential abusers may have traits that make 
their calculations different from average people.  In some cases, they would not have risen to 
power if they did not possess a degree of aggressive behavior and ruthlessness.  Many are also 
unusually high risk-takers which decreases deterrent effects.  For example, Ku and Nzelibe 
studied African coup plotters and concluded that international courts with a low probability of 
punishment will have little deterrent effect on these types of actors given the risks they are 
already willing to assume.
27
 
Average soldiers, police, and other citizens may be affected by some of these same 
factors since they also may be passionate believers in a cause or swept up in the government’s 
propaganda.  They also have more chance of being mentally impaired at the time of action.  In 
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and elsewhere there is evidence of widespread use of drugs and 
alcohol at the time of combat.
28
  Many countries also employ child soldiers, whose mental 
abilities are not fully developed and who may be susceptible to extreme agitation at time of great 
stress.  Additionally, in times of war or when domestic order has broken down, individual and 
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group ideas change so that acts that would normally be considered murder become heroic.  Like 
domestic rioters, groups of soldiers can be affected by arousal and deindividuation, which can 
lead to massacres, group rape, or wanton destruction of property. 
All together, these leader and follower traits have led Payam Akhavan, a believer in some 
deterrent effects of international courts, to note, “The threat of punishment . . . has a limited 
impact on human behavior in a culture already intoxicated with hatred and violence….  
[I]ndividuals are not likely to be easily deterred from committing crimes when engulfed in 
collective hysteria and routine cruelty.”
29
 
Unfortunately, there are many modern international examples where such conditions are 
the rule, rather than the exception.  Thus, while many potential human rights abusers are rational, 
an important subset will fail to meet the first criteria necessary for deterrence. 
 
Knowledge and Acceptance of the Laws and Courts 
For deterrence to work, potential criminals do not need to be legal experts, but they must 
know that a law exists, have some understanding of what the limitations the law imposes, and the 
potential punishments it brings.  Furthermore, deterrence works best when criminals accept both 
the law and the courts as legitimate, since they can then internalize the rules and self-regulate.  
Studies of U.S. residents show that a majority of citizens do not know the laws of their state that 
have been specifically designed to encourage or deter actions, such as their legal duty to report 
known felonies or regulations about the use of deadly force in protection of property.
30
  
Criminals might be expected to have better than average understanding of the law since it is 
more likely to affect them, but another study found that only 22 percent of males who had been 
9
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imprisoned for a felony reported that they had known “exactly what the punishment would be” 
for the crime they committed.
31
  Criminologists also have stressed the importance of accepting a 
law’s legitimacy arguing that “not viewing a particular law as legitimate is viewing it 
unfavorably. If one feels a law should not be followed, individuals will not see it as a right and 
proper restriction of behavior.”
32
  
The leaders and elite of the world are likely to know about the existence and essential 
outlines of international law.  International laws, though, are often broadly worded and their 
exact meanings are frequently debated by legal experts.  For example, U.S. soldiers are made 
aware of the Geneva Conventions governing the treatment of prisoners of war and of U.S. and 
international laws on torture.  On the other hand, there is ongoing dispute among experts on the 
legal status of those captured in the war on terrorism, and on definitions of torture, so broad 
knowledge of the laws may not equate to specific guidance on what tactics are allowable.  The 
meaning of laws also can shift over time.  Although rape has been considered a war crime for 
decades, it was not until the ICTR’s 1998 ruling in the Akayesu case that organized rape came to 
be considered an act of genocide.  Looking at the ICC specifically, it can prosecute individuals 
for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  This specific list gives the ICC more 
clarity than past ad hoc international tribunals, but there remain legal disputes over the meanings 
of all the terms. 
Additionally, there are few clear documents tying international crimes to specific 
punishments.  The documents establishing the ICTY, ICTR, and the ICC list crimes that fall 
within the courts’ jurisdiction, but describe the punishments that the courts can impose in a 
separate section.  There is no effort to match particular crimes to specific sentences, or even to 
clearly rank the severity of the crimes to indicate which should receive the longest sentences.  In 
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fact, Tribunal judges intentionally resisted creating explicit sentencing guidelines, so that 
sentences could be “individualized” to reflect aggravating and mitigating factors.  There may be 
good reasons for flexibility as institutions develop, but the lack of consistency means that even a 
knowledgeable potential human rights violator cannot know exactly what punishments his 
actions could bring. 
In a domestic setting, potential criminals may not know exactly what court would hear 
their case if they violate a law, but they do know that some court has jurisdiction.  In the 
international setting, jurisdiction is much less clear.  As noted, previous international courts and 
tribunals were established ad hoc to investigate events only in certain areas at certain time 
periods.  The establishment of the ICC removes some of the uncertainty of jurisdiction, but still 
leaves important limits.  The ICC has jurisdiction for crimes committed in member countries or 
by citizens of member countries.  As of 2013, 122 states are parties to the Rome Statute.  This 
leaves roughly eighty members of the UN, including the well-known exceptions of the United 
States, China, Russia and India, outside the permanent international court system.  The ICC also 
can investigate when a situation is referred to the Court by the UN Security Council, as was done 
in the cases of Sudan and Libya.  This referral system means that the governments of these 
countries did not know before their early actions that they would face the ICC.  Also, the fact 
that the UN referred Libya, but not Syria, shows that uncertainty about who will face the ICC 
remains. 
In terms of legitimacy, international law faces at least two major hurdles.  One problem is 
the overall balance between domestic and international law.  In a world of sovereign states, most 
of the power to create and enforce laws remains with state governments.  At the same time, the 
ICC is asserting that certain actions are governed by international laws and should be punished 
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by an international court.  This tension is a major reason why the principle of complementarity 
was developed, with the ICC only hearing cases when national courts cannot provide effective 
justice.  There are mechanisms for determining when the ICC should step in, but there is also 
flexibility, so violators might hope that their case will be heard in national courts that they could 
possibly influence.  Philosophically, many world leaders will not accept a decline in sovereign 
power, or see international law and the ICC as being legitimate sources of legal and moral 
restraint. Again, the ICC’s deterrent effect is weakened. 
Secondly, legitimacy rests on the idea of fair and equal treatment.  There are long-
standing accusations that international law and institutions are biased in favor of Western values, 
are merely tools of selected Great Powers, or are a form of “victor’s justice.”  Noted scholars 
such as E.H Carr
33
 and Stanley Hoffman
34
 have argued that other actors may not accept the 
legitimacy of laws structured by the great powers.  For example, President Omar Al-Bashir of 
Sudan repeatedly has argued that international law, the UN, and the ICC are all biased.  The fact 
that the ICC’s first seven investigations were of African states has drawn attention.  If the ICC 
only focuses on Africa, it will lose legitimacy in the eyes of some, but if it opens an investigation 
elsewhere and is perceived as simply trying to appease political pressures, it will lose legitimacy 
in the eyes of others.  It is possible that a leader may fear the actions of even what he considers 
an illegitimate court, but questions of legitimacy do decrease the chance that such leaders will 
internalize the ICC’s moral goals and act with self-restraint. 
Foot soldiers or lower level officials who commit violations may be affected by the same 
issues affecting leaders, but also may have a simple lack of knowledge.  The education levels and 
limited communications in some areas make it highly improbable that the average members of 
the janjaweed in Darfur or Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda are aware of the Universal 
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Declaration on Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, or past rulings of international courts 
establishing what constitutes a war crime.  Even if they are aware, the potential violators may not 
see that as a signal of what will happen directly to them.  International courts are located far from 
conflict areas, conduct their business in languages not spoken universally, and are rarely covered 
by local media.  Their actions thus may seem quite removed from everyday life.  This helps 
explain why the Rwandan government objected to locating the ICTR in Arusha, Tanzania, 
feeling that some of the deterrent effect of the trials would be lost by conducting them so far 
away from the crimes scenes.  The ICC does attempt education efforts, but they are targeted at 
areas with investigations, so, while important in explaining ongoing proceedings to citizens, they 
are unlikely to inform potential violators ahead of time.  If some potential violators are unaware 
of the international criminality of their actions or feel that the laws and courts are unclear or 
illegitimate, then for that group another criterion for deterrence fails. 
 
Costs and Benefits 
While potential criminals must be able to think rationally and know the laws designed to 
limit their actions, the core requirement for deterrence is that the potential violator perceives the 
total costs of an action as exceeding its total benefits.  Understanding costs and benefits involves 
calculating not only the possible positive or negative outcomes, but also the probability and 
timing of a given outcome.  In attempting to deter crime, lawmakers usually focus on altering 
things on the cost side, either by increasing the amount of punishment or increasing the chance 
of punishment.  Game research shows that the expected level and chance of positive rewards is 
13
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  If criminals perceive that crime will lead them to riches, power, personal 
security, or other gains, they are encouraged to break the law despite costs. 
Benefits 
Assessing the cost-benefit calculations made in the international arena begins with the 
idea that international courts deal with only the most serious violations of international law such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  These types of crimes do not develop 
spontaneously, or arise from a series of miscalculations, but rather stem from leaders’ choices on 
how to achieve political goals and to address threats.  For example, leaders may pursue clear 
goals of advancing their ethnic group or expanding their territory.  Leaders and their followers 
then may adopt brutal tactics to achieve these goals.  Asserting control of an area, while driving 
others out, can be seen as a path to future economic and material gain, and to easier future 
political control as the area comes closer to the model of a nation-state and challengers are 
weakened.  Ethnic cleansing and genocide may look like random violence from the outside, but 
there is calculation of how to achieve goals behind it. 
On the threat side, leaders seek to stay in power, so they will often oppress members of 
rival political, economic or ethnic groups, or support tough tactics against outside enemies.  
When these differences rise to the level of civil or international war, the leaders are likely to 
increase the brutality of the tactics they endorse.  The leaders know they will face international 
criticism, but the perceived benefit of staying in power is a major incentive.  In the same way 
that domestic criminals may not be deterred if the payoff is large enough, the ability to reduce a 
threat may offset leaders internal moral norms and any punishment that outsiders could threaten. 
14
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Human rights abusers in lower levels of authority may be driven by the same ambitions 
as their leaders, but also face additional pressures.  Lower officials may feel it is necessary for 
their advancement or even personal security to follow the brutal orders of superiors.  
International courts have ruled that violations cannot be excused with the “simply following 
orders” defense, but this does not change the reality that the short-term benefit of loyalty may be 
high.  Tomer Broude notes, “We also know that many of the most serious crimes are committed 
by individuals as ‘crimes of obedience,’ in structures of authority that demand compliance in 
ways that the jurisdiction of the Court cannot compete with.”
36
  When order further breaks down, 
new pressures arise.  Mark A. Drumbl notes that “Amid the social disintegration and group-
based reconstitution that usually precedes mass violence, individuals often end up joining a 
marauding group because to do so is the only viable survival strategy.”
37
  Joining may provide 
physical security and a sense of belonging and support at a time of crisis. 
None of these comments is meant to in any way excuse human rights abuse, but rather to 
suggest that violators often perceive major benefits from violations.  They also are balancing an 
immediate reward versus a chance of future punishment. 
Probability of Punishment 
On the cost side of the equation, a key calculation is the probability of being punished.  
Looking at domestic deterrence, probability of punishment is the variable most closely tied to 
deterrent effects.
38
  Past gaming studies show that punishment rates of 50 percent will have a 
significant deterrent effect.  If, however, the chance of punishment decreases, the deterrent effect 
quickly dissipates.
39
  Since the overall conviction rate for criminal offences committed in the 
United States is estimated to be only 1.3 percent, effective domestic deterrence is low.
40
  Since 
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the ICC faces both structural and political limits that decrease the chance of arrest and further 
factors that limit the chance of conviction effective international deterrence is even less probable. 
As noted earlier, one structural constraint on the ICC is its limited jurisdiction so that 
some violators face no threat of arrest unless the UN Security Council refers their country for 
investigation.  A second major limit is the lack of an international police force to arrest suspects.  
This role can at times be filled by troops, but events and policies in the former Yugoslavia show 
that international troops do not prioritize arresting suspects.  Even if a police force was created, it 
would still face the major barrier of sovereignty, so could only act when backed by force or when 
invited in by the state government.  A third limit is that the ICC only has the resources to conduct 
a limited number of trials.  As one ICC judge said, “If only for reasons of cost and capacity, the 
Court will never be able to do more than conduct a few, exemplary trials.”
41
  These resource 
limits, along with the principle that cases should have “sufficient gravity,” have so far limited the 
ICC to only focus on leaders, so the current threat of arrest for most violators is almost zero. 
Political limits affect both the chance of ICC investigation and arrest.  States choosing 
not to join the court greatly decrease their chance of investigation.  Political limits also exist 
because of UN Security Council voting rules.  If there was a resolution calling for the 
investigation of a great power who is not a member of the ICC, any one of the five great powers 
with veto rights could block the resolution.  Similarly, the great power could block investigation 
of a close ally.  Once an investigation does begin, the ICC relies on state cooperation, which may 
not be forthcoming, to get access to evidence and witnesses.  After indictment, member states are 
obligated to arrest and transfer suspects to the ICC.  However, the African Union’s July 2009 
Resolution opposing cooperation with ICC in the case of al-Bashir and his subsequent travel to 
ICC member countries show that, even for ICC members, politics can trump legal obligation.  
16
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Further, even if states would like to cooperate, they may not be able to capture suspects, as 
illustrated by Uganda’s inability to capture leaders of the Lord’s Resistance Army.  As William 
W. Burke-White has noted, while Joseph Kony may have at first feared ICC helicopters carrying 
him off, “[y]ears later and still at large, Kony and other international criminals must have come 
to realize that helicopters are not on their way and life on the run—even as an indicted 
international criminal—is not so bad.”
42
. 
Domestic realities also decrease the chance of trial for many leaders.  Dictators and other 
abusers have often maintained power for a long time through a mix of intimidation and co-opting 
rivals.  Their chance of being overthrown and turned over to international courts is not zero, as 
shown in the case of Milosevic, but it is not  high.  Further, leaders tend to surround themselves 
with loyal officials who reinforce their sense of control.  Thus, for practical and psychological 
reasons, leaders may feel close to invulnerable. 
The ICC has publically indicted thirty-six people, but only six have been put on trial, 
with another seven in the pre-trial phase.  Compared to the number of violators globally, these 
numbers show a given violator has an extremely low chance of facing trial.  The numbers could 
be skewed by the court’s early years of institutional building, so further insight can be gained 
from examining numbers from the ICTR and ICTY, with the caveat that in those cases there 
were political circumstances favoring arrests.  In Rwanda, estimates put the 1994 death toll at 
500,000 and a complete list of Rwandan human rights abuses surely would be several time that 
number.  The Rwandan government responded by jailing well over 100,000 people.  Yet, the 
ICTR has handed down only ninety indictments.  As of 2012, only sixty-nine of the tens of 
thousands of abusers had completed a trial and some of these cases are still under appeal.  In the 
former-Yugoslavia there were fewer domestic arrests to use as a proxy number for all abusers, 
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but again the number of international law violators is certainly considerably higher than the 161 
people indicted by the ICTY or the seventy-seven who have completed Tribunal trials. 
Reaching trial does not guarantee a conviction.  Prosecutors may find evidence is difficult 
to gather and witness testimony difficult to obtain.  Also, to their credit, the ICC and other 
international courts have done their best to provide fair trials and judgments.  Only in March 
2012 did the ICC complete its first conviction.  Thomas Lubanga Dyilo from the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo was convicted of war crimes, although he is appealing.  At that point 
another official, Mathieu Ngudjola Chui was acquitted and released.  Again the tribunals provide 
further insight.  At the Tribunals, some had cases dropped in process and others were acquitted, 
so the number of convicted and sentenced stands at fifty-nine for the ICTR and sixty-four for the 
ICTY.  Notably, most defendants face multiple counts.  As of September 2004, excluding those 
who pled guilty, Meernik, King, and Dancy found that defendants were found guilty on 48.8 
percent of individual counts.  Subdividing the data they find “the percentage of guilty verdicts 
for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide cases are 49.8 percent, 62.5 percent, and 
20 percent, respectively.”
43
  These numbers are higher than the zero they would have been for 
years before international courts for human rights were established.  Thus, the court can claim 
progress in ending impunity.  However, from the perspective of deterrence, these numbers 
indicate a very low probability of punishment and thus a low chance of deterring future 
violations. 
Speed of Punishment 
For both benefits and costs, there may be some delay before the final outcome.  People 
tend to discount future costs when compared to current costs.  Therefore, a 10 percent chance of 
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being executed five years in the future will not carry the same weight as a 10 percent chance of 
dying in a gun battle today.  Benefits are similarly discounted over time, but often the benefits 
occur more immediately than the potential costs.  Overall, scholars suggest, “the criminal justice 
system reflects a picture of a threat of delayed punishment pitted against the attraction of 
immediate benefits of crime.”
44
 
On the international level, the process of getting a violator through the courts is long and 
complex.  First, violations must occur and must rise to the level to draw international attention.  
Then, investigations must be made and arrests must occur, both of which can take years.  Once 
arrested, the accused go through a series of pre-trial, trial, and appeals stages and there are often 
delays and pauses at each step. 
As mentioned previously, the ICC has only completed a single case.  The example of the 
Central African Republic’s Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo gives some indication of the process.  He 
led the Movement for the Liberation of Congo and was accused of violations in 2002.  The case 
was referred to the Court by the Central African Republic Government in December 2004.  The 
prosecutor opened an investigation in May 2007 and a sealed arrest warrant was issued in May 
2008.  Bemba was arrested in Belgium and transferred to the ICC only days after the arrest 
warrant, so that step went unusually quickly.  The pretrial chamber confirmed two charges of 
crimes against humanity and three charges of war crimes in June 2009.  His trial started in 
November 2010.  The trial has had a number of delays and recesses, so Bemba even requested, 
but was denied, provisional release during Court recesses.  At least a decade will pass between 
Bemba’s alleged crimes and completion of his trial, and should there be an appeal, it could 
stretch even longer. 
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Similar experiences can be seen from the Tribunals.  Established in 1993, the ICTY still 
has not completed its work almost two decades later.  The court projects that it will at least mid-
2017 before it completes its final cases.  Measured against the immediate benefit of a given 
action, the possibility that one might face trial twenty years later is not a great deterrent for most 
actors. 
Severity of Punishment 
There is more dispute over the impact of increasing the severity of punishments.  
Criminologists often argue that “the likelihood of punishment tends to matter more than the 
severity of punishment,” whereas economists argue “an increase in either the likelihood or the 
severity of punishment will tend to reduce the net subjective payoff” and therefore reduce 
crime.
45
  This disagreement is one reason why so much research attention has been focused on 
whether the threat of capital punishment marginally increases deterrence in comparison to the 
threat of a life sentence.  The findings on capital punishment and other similar increases in 
severity remain mixed,
46
 so it seems reasonable to still consider severity of punishment as a 
variable, but to not expect a huge surge in deterrence if punishments are increased. 
In contrast to the Nuremberg trials after WWII, recent international court punishment 
options do not include death sentences because of growing international opposition to capital 
punishment.  The ICC can impose sentences up to thirty years, but in extreme cases the Court 
may impose a life sentence.  The judges take into consideration the severity of the crime, but also 
numerous aggravating and mitigating factors in determining the individualized sentence.  These 
aggravating factors include such things as whether the offense was against women, the accused 
was in a position of authority, and whether there was direct and enthusiastic participation in the 
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crime.  Mitigating factors include cooperation with the prosecution, remorse, willing surrender, 
age, and character before and after the violations.   
The sentencing guidelines make no explicit reference to the goal of deterrence, or any 
other overall goal to use in determining punishment.  The Tribunals also lacked firm sentencing 
guidance, but the judges provided explanation of their sentences, which led to development of 
something of a sentencing philosophy.  In the Tadic case, the ICTY judges argued “deterrence is 
probably the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences for violations of 
international humanitarian law.”
47
  In the Rutaganda case, the judges noted, “it is clear that 
penalties imposed on accused persons found guilty by the Tribunal must be directed on the one 
hand, at retribution . . .and over and above that, on the other hand, at deterrence to dissuade for 
good, others who may be tempted in the future to perpetrate such atrocities.”
48
 
Since the ICTY has handed out the most sentences, a review of its sentences provides 
some indication of what future violators can expect.  The median final sentence imposed for 
those found guilty by the ICTY is just thirteen years.
49
  Only one life sentence has been imposed 
and only about one-third of cases saw a punishment of twenty years or more.  Some of those 
receiving sentences of a dozen years or less include the killer of seventy Muslims at Srebrenica, 
and others convicted of multiple counts, including inciting genocide.  These sentences provide a 
degree of retribution, but they are not severe enough for a potential future violator to always 
judge that the costs of action outweigh the benefits.  
The domestic literature suggests costs can include more than just incarceration.  For 
example, a conviction may hurt someone’s reputation, lead them to be ostracized from groups, or 
hurt their earning potential.  In the international arena, ICC convictions, and even indictments, 
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can bring costs.  Leaders may not be able to travel abroad if they fear arrest.  Their reputations 
and place in history will be forever associated with the ICC, and they may not be able to retire in 
luxury as did many past dictators.  Still, these costs are still relatively low compared to the 
benefits of continued rule.  They also may not be as great as expected, as witnessed by Bashir’s 
travel after indictment and the 2013 election of Uhuru Kenyatta as President of Kenya despite his 
existing ICC indictment.  Therefore, the ICC’s specific non-incarceration impact will not be 
enough to deter many. 
Overall, the costs of violations, as affected by probability of punishment, speed, and 
severity of punishment, often will be judged low, so the ICC will not meet the core criteria of 
effective deterrence. 
 
Implications for the Future 
Overall, the chance that the ICC will deter human rights violators is very small since 
some potential violators will not be acting rationally at the time of committing an abuse.  Others 
will not know about the international laws and courts or will not see them as legitimate.  Even 
those who make rational calculations and are aware will often conclude that the benefits of 
violation exceed the costs.  This conclusion is in line with the facts that violations have 
continued globally despite the Tribunals and creation of the ICC and that some of the worst 
violations in the former Yugoslavia, Sudan and Libya occurred after indictments of several 
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The limits on deterrence are many, so significantly increasing the deterrent effect would 
be difficult unless there were radical changes in the international system.  For example, 
deterrence could increase if a higher percentage of violators were brought before the court.  
Achieving this goal could require a strong international police force, but such a force would 
require a new commitment in funding, and, more importantly, a new willingness to support 
enforcement mechanisms for international institutions and to weaken sovereignty.  Similar ideas 
have been considered by the UN for decades, but the UN remains without a permanent force or 
the unfettered right to intervene in sovereign states.  Arrests and transfers also might increase if 
states placed the goal of arresting violators above other political calculations; however, since 
many powerful states show no signs of joining the ICC and even member states adjust their 
compliance to political needs, this change is unlikely to occur any time soon. 
Since deterrent effects are likely to remain minimal, supporters of the ICC should stop 
touting deterrence and rather stress goals that the ICC can achieve.  If they want to pursue 
prevention, there are other mechanisms.  If they are still focused on deterrence, they could 
explore the use of domestic courts and truth commissions or other forms of international 
punishment like targeted sanctions that can be imposed more quickly.  Deterrence also should be 
dropped as a basis for sentencing practices of international courts.  Whether more focus on 
retribution or incapacitation would lead to significantly different sentences is unclear, but at least 
those sentences would have a firmer moral and legal basis. 
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